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Abstract. Modeling and analyzing risk is one of the most critical ac-
tivity in system engineering and approaches like Fault Tree Analysis,
Event Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Criticality Analysis have been
proposed in literature. All these approaches focus on the system-to-be
without considering the impact of the associated risks to the organiza-
tion where the system will operate. On the other hand, the tendency is
more and more to consider software development as a part of organiza-
tional development. In this paper, we propose a framework to model and
reason about risk at organizational level, namely considering the system-
to-be along the organizational setting. The framework extends Tropos, a
methodology that has been proved effective in modeling strategic inter-
ests of the stakeholders at organizational level. We introduce a number of
different means that help the analyst to identify and enumerate relevant
treatments for risk mitigation. Experimental results are finally presented
and discussed.
1 Introduction
Software systems are more and more part of our life (look how many computers
and electronic gadgets are around you), and very often this introduces a broad
and strong influence of software in our daily life decisions. The tendency is to
consider them as integral and active part of the environment and for this their
development has to be considered as part of the social-network development. In
this direction, some software engineering methodologies have been introduced
(e.g., Tropos [1] and KAOS [2]) to capture since the early phases of the software
development the relationships between the software-to-be and the organizational
setting. In this new scenario, traditional techniques for modeling and analyzing
risk (e.g., Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [3], Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [3], Failure
Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [4]) have to be reconsidered to
extend the analysis to the organization in which the system-to-be will operate.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [5] assesses a risk answering to three basic
questions: (1) what can go wrong? (2) how likely is it? and (3) what are the
consequences? Those traditional techniques are commonly used in Reliability
and Safety community, but unfortunately these techniques are not thought to
model the risks at organizational level and they mainly focus on the risks at the
system level.
We already have proposed a modeling and reasoning framework to consider
risk (more in general uncertain event) at organizational level [6]. The framework
extends the Tropos goal models [7, 8] proposing a three layers analysis (i.e.,
goal, event, and treatment) and algorithms for qualitative reasoning. Section 2
summarizes briefly the framework. In this paper, we extended and refine the
framework proposing new types of relationship (modification relation) that allow
us to model and analyze circumstances where a countermeasure mitigates a
risk reducing its impact and not only the likelihood. Along these relationships,
we will introduce new axioms, a refinement of the risk analysis process, and
novel reasoning mechanisms (Section 3). We, also, define new types of mitigation
actions that can be applied as a part of the solution and we define the guidelines
to choose and model them ( 4). We conclude the paper with some experimental
results (Section 5) and a final discussion (Section 6).
2 Tropos Goal-Risk Analysis
Tropos has proposed a formal framework to refine stakeholders’ goals and end
up with elicits the requirements. The framework can also model the existence
of uncertain events, mainly risks, that could give influence to the fulfilment of
the goals and treatments that need to be taken to manage the effect of risks.
There are three entities that construct goal models, namely Goal, Event (e.g.,
risk, opportunity), and Treatment (e.g., tasks, countermeasure). Goal analysis
results in a number of goal models represented as a graph 〈G,R〉, where G are
nodes (i.e., goals, events, and treatments) and R are relations (decomposition
or contribution relations) among them. If (N1, . . . , Nn)
r7−→ N is one of the node
relations in R , N1 ,. . . , Nn are called as the source nodes and N is the target
node of relation r.
Each node has two attributes SAT- Sat(N) and DEN- Den(N) and N ∈
{G,E, T}, which quantify the value of evidence for node being satisfied and de-
nied, respectively. Those attributes are indicated as node label and are repre-
sented by 6 different satisfaction predicates:
– FS(N), FD(N): there is (at least) full evidence that goal G is satisfied (or
denied), event E occurs, or treatment T succeeds;
– FS(N), PD(N): there is (at least) partial evidence that goal G is satisfied
(or denied), event E occurs, or treatment T succeeds;
– NS(N), ND(N): there is none evidence that goal G is satisfied (or denied),
event E occurs, or treatment T succeeds. Actually, they are the same
with T predicate in [9]. It is not mandatory to write these predicates in
formalization; they could leave implicitly.
The predicates state that there is at least a given level of evidence for the node
achievement, and it implies that FS(N) ≥ PS(N) ≥ NS(N) and FD(N) ≥
PD(N) ≥ ND(N), with intended meaning x ≥ y ↔ x→ y. .
Fig. 1. Part of Goal Model for the Vehicle Production Department
Each entity has separate layer of analysis (see Fig. 1. And each entity can be
analyzed using the relations (e.g., decompositions and contributions). Qualita-
tive goal analysis in Tropos starts with a number of stakeholders’ goals (called
top goals) and each of them is refined by decomposition (AND or OR) into
subgoals.
For example, consider to model the strategic objectives of reduce labor costs
(G8) is OR-decomposed into reduce man-power by machine (G13) and reduce
salaries (G4). This decomposition and refinements will continue until the goals
are not considered tangible goals, i.e., when there is an actor that can fulfill the
goal.
After analyzing the goal layer, we continue to analyze the relevant event that
could influence the fulfillment of the goal in goal layer. We define an event as
an uncertain circumstance that could influence to the fulfillment of goals [6].
Events can be identified applying different approaches (e.g., obstacle analysis in
KAOS [10], Taxonomy-base risk identification [11], or Risk in Finance [12]). Af-
terwards, an event is analyzed by a decomposition relation into sub-events until
each leaf event can be considered as an independent event. In our framework,
a risk is defined as an uncertain event with negative impact and an opportu-
nity with positive impact. We represent likelihood by the level of evidence that
supports and prevents the occurrence of the event (SAT and DEN), and the level
of influence of an event is encoded as the type of contribution relation between
event and goal. Since the effect of an event obstructs a goal only when it occurs
(i.e., denial of an event does not give any impacts), in our model we use only rS
relations, i.e., ++S , +S , −S , and −−S , between an event and goals.
An event can influence more than one goal. For example, in Fig. 1 the event
strike (E5) obstructs the satisfaction of reducing salaries (G14) because in this
circumstance labors can demand an increment of the salary. On the other hand,
it also obstructs the goal improve production chain (G5) since it can compromise
and slow down the production. An event can be considered as a risk for certain
goals and at the same time as an opportunity for other goals. For instance, the
event have a new competitor (E7) is a risk that obstructs the achievement of
the goal high specialized labour (G15) because the competitor can offer better
conditions to the labor. However, the event can also be seen as an opportunity for
the goal improve work environment (G12), because it gives more motivations to
the employees to compete with other companies. Event refinement will continue
until leaf-events are assessable (i.e., we can assess the likelihood of leaf-event)
and the modeler needs to ensure each leaf-event is mutually exclusive.
Once the events have been analyzed, the modeler identifies and analyzes the
countermeasures to be adopted in order to mitigate the risks. The mitigation of
a risk can be realized in two different ways: reducing the likelihood or reducing
the impact. However in our previous work [6], we did not support the mitigation
with reducing the impact of risk. In next section, we explain how to model this
type of mitigation in Tropos goal model.
Similarly to goals and events, for countermeasures we use SAT and DEN to
represent the evidence that supports and prevents the action. A countermeasure
has effect on the event layer, and in particular over risks. We represent the effect
of a countermeasure as a relation, where its strength is expressed by the type of
contribution relations. As for events, we are interested to the propagation of the
evidence for the success of a countermeasure (SAT) and therefore we limit the
relations between countermeasures and events to rS relations. A countermeasure
mitigates a risk when it adds (propagates) evidence for its denial.
In our model we also allow for relations between the treatment layer and the
goal layer. This is useful to model situations where a countermeasure adopted
to mitigate a risk has also a contribution (especially negative) to some goals.
For instance in Fig. 1, the countermeasure create a labor association (T2) can
mitigate the likelihood of the event strike (E5) – of course this is not always true.
However, the association can have a better bargaining power w.r.t. the individual
worker and obtain an increment of the salaries. This produces a negative effect
on the satisfaction of the goal reduce salaries (G14).
After finish building the model, we can start analyzing the model and elicit-
ing the most reasonable solution to fulfill the stakeholders’ goals. The solution
consists of the leaf goals that need to be fulfilled, the treatments that need to
be employed to manage the risks of the model and the total cost (leaf goals and
treatments). The detail explanation of each step can be seen in [6].
3 Modification Relation in Goal-Risk Model
In previous work, we realize a possibility that a countermeasure mitigate the
risk by reducing its impacts, which was not supported, besides reducing the
likelihood. This paper will extent Tropos Goal-Risk Model to model it by intro-
ducing modification relation. The basic idea of this relation is adding evidence
s.t. changes the type of contribution relations.




r is the type of contribution link, and rS is the types of modification relation
(i.e., ++S ,+S ,−−S ,−S). The difference semantics of modification relations can
be seen at its axioms at Fig. 2. In new axiomatization, we can see new symbol
(i.e., ∅) for contribution relation. It means the contribution relation does not
deliver any evidence to the target node. For instance (Axiom 2), it states that in
−−S modification relation, once treatment T has full evidence being satisfied,
it will nullify (∅) the target contribution relation (i.e., before is −− relation).
Treatment Invariant Axioms
T : FS(T )→ PS(T ) (1)
Treatment to cont. rel. Relation Axioms
T
−−S7−→ [−−7−→] : FS(T) → [ ∅7−→] (2)
PS(T) → [ −7−→] (3)
T
−−S7−→ [++7−→] : FS(T) → [ ∅7−→] (4)





−−S7−→ [ +7−→] : PS(T) → [ ∅7−→] (6)
T
−S7−→ [−−7−→] : FS(T) → [ −7−→] (7)
T
−S7−→ [++7−→] : FS(T) → [ +7−→] (8)
T
−S7−→ [ −7−→] : FS(T) → [ ∅7−→] (9)
T
−S7−→ [ +7−→] : FS(T) → [ ∅7−→] (10)
T
+S7−→ [ −7−→] : FS(T) → [−−7−→] (11)
T
+S7−→ [ +7−→] : FS(T) → [++7−→] (12)
T
++S7−→ [ −7−→] : PS(T) → [−−7−→] (13)
T
++S7−→ [ +7−→] : PS(T) → [++7−→] (14)
Fig. 2. Basic Axioms of Modification Relations
As an example the treatment manage oil supply (T1) does not reduce the
likelihood of the risk oil price raise (E1) (as we model before in [6]). The correct
modeling way of that circumstance is the T1 mitigates E1 by reducing the
impact of oil price raise to the goal (see Fig. 3(a)). If we assume T3 has evidence
full of being succeeded then the initial model (Fig. 3(a)) evolves becoming to
another model in Fig 3(b) based on Axiom 7.
Finally, we can categorize the treatment into two classes based on its influ-
ence: evidence treatment (i.e., a treatment that changes the value of evidence of
target node) and effect treatment (i.e., a treatment that changes the type of con-
tribution relation). A treatment can occupy both classes. The effect treatment is
(a) initial model (b) final model
Fig. 3. Modification Relation
preferable while an event has both impacts (positive and negative), because by
means of this treatment we can reduce only the negative impact instead both of
them. If we use evidence treatment on this circumstance, then we will lose also
the opportunity besides reducing the risk.
3.1 Analysis Mechanisms
The new axioms that have been introduced in previous section, causes a change
on the model itself instead changes only the values of model. This fact results
an adjustment to the risk analysis steps and several algorithms need to be in-
troduced to reason on the new goal model. In the new framework, we can do
the similar analysis that has been performed in previous work [6]. We refine the
steps of how a modeler performs analysis on the goal model with considering
related risks and countermeasures and eliciting the set of optimal solution in Al-
gorithm 1. This framework is aiming to support modeller to explore the possible
alternative and calculate the defined parameters (e.g., number of SAT and DEN
evidence and the cost of alternative solution), and the decision should be taken
manually (i.e., either by modeler or stakeholder).
The Algorithm 1, basically, is alike with the previous one [6] and the only
different is Adjust Model in line 5. Basically, the analysis process consists of the
following two steps:
1. find the alternative solutions (line 2-3);
2. evaluate each alternative (line 4-19);
(a) adjust the goal mode based on the evaluated alternative (line 5);
(b) assess the risks obstruction to the goal layer (line 9-11);
(c) assess the countermeasures effectiveness to mitigate the risks (line 12-
17).
The process starts taking in an input the goal model and a set of desired val-
ues for top goals (i.e., satisfaction values-SAT and acceptable risk values-DEN),
and a number of goals as possible candidates for the final solution (input goals).
Then Backward Reasoning [8] (line 2) elicits a set of possible assignment values
for the input goals such that satisfies the desired values. The modeler chooses a
Algorithm 1 Risk Analysis Process
Ensure: analyse risk for each alternative solutions and find necessary countermeasures to ensure
the satisfaction of top goals.
Require: goal model 〈G,R〉, label array top goals, node array input goals, label array events
1: solution array solution {solution that has already encompassed risks and necessary countermea-
sures}
2: alt solution ←Backward Reasoning(〈G,R〉,nil, top goals, input goals)
3: candidate solution ←Select Can Solution(alt solution)
{candidate solution ⊆ alt solution}
4: for all Si ∈ candidate solution do
5: 〈G,R′〉 ←Adjust Model〈G,R〉{propagates all modification relations to all related contribu-
tion relations}
6: if Satisfy(〈G,R′〉, top goals, 〈Si, events,nil〉) then
7: add(solution,〈Si,nill, Calc Cost(Si,nil)〉)
8: else
9: boolean array Related Goals ←Related Goals(〈G,R′〉, Si)
10: labels ←Standard Forward Reasoning(〈G,R′〉, Si)
11: acc events ←Calc Event(labels, related goals, events)
12: nec treatment ←Backward Reasoning(〈G,R′〉, events, acc events, avail treatment)
13: for all Tj ∈ nec treatment do
14: if Satisfy(〈G,R′〉, top goals, 〈Si, events, Tj〉) then





subset of the alternatives on the basis of a certain criteria (e.g., minimum-cost [8],
softgoals) called candidate solution (line 3). The rest of analysis process will be
limited to this subset. Each candidate solution is now evaluated against risks
and then necessary countermeasures are introduced (line 4-19). Before start eval-
uating the goal model, we need to adjust model (line 5) by following Algorithm 2
(i.e., it applies all the effects of modification relations). Then, the modeller checks
whether the candidate solution in adjusted model needs countermeasures to ob-
tain the desired values in the top goals. If not the candidate solution is added
directly to the solution and its cost is calculated (line 7). Otherwise, counter-
measures must be introduced in the candidate solution (line 9-17).
For applying modification relation, we perform Algorithm 2 with taking in
〈G,R〉 as initial goal model and a set of initial values of input goals. The Algo-
rithm 2 will modify the model (i.e., strictly speaking R) until the model stable
(line 5), i.e., no change anymore, in terms of the relation in goal model and
the final values. First step is doing New Forward Reasoning [6] to gain the
final evidence values of all nodes in the model (in this step, modification re-
lations are not considered). Based on the those values, we apply modification
relations on the initial model 〈G,R〉 by changing the type of all related contri-
bution relations following Update Relation (Algorithm 3) and results the new
model 〈G,R′〉. Update Relation basically calculates all the impacts of modifica-
tion relations over a particular contribution relation. Apply Rules Modify Rel
is a function to define the effect of a modification relation over a contribution
relation, that is underlain by the axioms in Fig. 2. If a contribution relation
relates with several modification relations, we will take the worst possible mod-
ification. For that purpose, we define the order of contribution relation types:
−− ¿ − ¿ ∅ and ∅ ¿ + ¿ ++, with intended meaning −− is worse than −
and respectively for others. This principle (in line (5) and (7)) intends to make
the organization be prepared with the worst condition.
Algorithm 2 Adjust Model
Ensure: Adjust Goal Model (Attribute values and Relation Types)
Require: goal model 〈G,R〉, label array init val
1: goal model cur model, old model
2: label array cur val
3: cur model ←〈G,R〉
4: cur val ←init val
5: while old model 6= cur model and old value 6= cur model do
6: old model ←cur model
7: old value ←cur value
8: cur value ←New Forward Reasoning(cur model, init val)
9: for all Ri ∈ R s.t. ∃Rel ∈ R : target(Rel) = Ri do
10: cur model.R[i] ←Update Relation(i, init model, cur val)
11: end for
12: end while
13: Normalize Model(cur model){Pruning relation (R) s.t. R = [ ∅7−→] or target(R) = [ r7−→]}
14: return cur model
Algorithm 3 Update Relation
Ensure: Change the type of contribution in goal model
Require: int i, goal model 〈G,R〉, label array value
1: for all Rj ∈ R s.t. target(Rj) = 〈G,R〉.Ri do
2: arcj ←Apply Rules Modify Rel(Rj , value)
3: end for
4: if Is Negative(old.model.R[i]) then {the type is risk relation i.e., “− or −−”}
5: rel type ←Max Array(arc)
6: else {opportunity relation i.e., “+ or ++”}
7: rel type ←Min Array(arc)
8: end if
9: return rel type
4 Alternative Solution of Risks in Goal-Risk Model
After extending the goal model to coup with all possible behavior of a treatment
(e.g., by changing the evidence value of target nodes or by changing the impact of
contribution relation). This paper will also explain the guidelines for a modeler
while facing the risks in order to manage them such that acceptable for the
fulfillment of stakeholders’ goals.
Basically, there are two way that could be taken while we have a risk in
our organization, the first is trying to find other alternative s.t there is no risk
related with it and the other is mitigating the risk s.t. it is acceptable. Once the
modelers decide to elicit a treatment to mitigate a risks, they need to be aware
with the effects to other entities (i.e., goal, event, treatment).
We categorize treatments into 5 types of measure that can be used to over-
come the risk: avoidance, prevention, alleviation, detection, and retention. The
order of the types can be seen also as the steps in eliciting the treatments. First,
the modelers try to find the way to avoid the risks, if it is not possible then they
should try to prevent the occurrence the risks. If the prevention measures are
not adequate then try to identify the alleviation measures. If it is also not ade-
quate, then they need to identify the detection measures otherwise they should
be ready with any retention measures.
The next passage will detailed them by specifying what are the model char-
acteristics that can lead in choosing the proper type of measures and what is the
consequences (advantage and disadvantage) of each type. However, the model
characteristics are defined, as follow:
– for goal (i.e., is defined as leaf goal in goal layer): the importance of the
goal and its fulfillment type (i.e., achieve goal, maintain goal, and achieve-
maintain goal [13]);
– for event (i.e., is defined as top event in event layer): the impacts and likeli-
hood of the event, the structure of event tree in event layer, and the type of
risks (e.g., avoidable, preventable, reduceable);
– for treatment (i.e., is defined as leaf treatment in treatment layer), the success
rate in mitigating the risks, the cost of the treatment.
4.1 Avoidance
It defines as an activity that tries to achieve the stakeholders’ goals by choosing
an alternative in which there is no risks related to it.
Fig. 4. Avoidance Means
Model characteristic for this type is the goal fulfillment is very important for the
stakeholders and most of the time, the goal is categorized as a maintain goal or
an achieve-maintain goal. Thus, the modeler should ensure its fulfilment all the
time. However, this type of measures is not always possible to be elicited, there
is a circumstance in which the modeler do not have any alternatives to fulfill the
goal with risk free. For example in Fig. 4, the modeler can fulfill G8 by means
of choosing G13 or G14 . In this scenario, the modeler choose G13 instead
of G14 because G8 must be fulfilled all over the time.
Consequence of this type is no need to introduce any treatments that possibly
give bad impacts to the goal layer besides the good ones. The only possible
drawback of this type is the risk-free alternative could be more costly than the
total cost risky alternative and its treatments. Therefore, there is a possibility
which the cost of G13 is higher than the cost G14 and its treatment (e.g.,
T2 ).
4.2 Prevention
This activity demands the modeler to elicit any treatments that can prevent the
occurrence of the negative event. The notion of prevent means reduce the risk
until acceptable value for fulfillment of stakeholders’ goals.
Fig. 5. Prevention Means
Model characteristic that suits for this type is the risk obstructs significantly
the stakeholders’ goals and unavoidable. This type of measures are carried on by
reducing the likelihood of related leaf-events s.t. the likelihood of the top-event is
also reduced. To identify the related leaf-events, we can use the same technique
that commonly used in defining minimal cut-set in FTA [3]. For instance (in
Fig. 5), build back up test environment (T6) is a measure that dedicated to elim-
inate the possibility of unavailability of testing environment because of broken
test environment (E9) occurs. This type is less economic while meets the risk
with many alternatives of occurrence (or-decomposition), because the risk will
be really reduced when we prevent all the leaf-events of the risk. For instance,
Regular Training and Assessment for Test Designer (T9) is not really effective
to reduce the ignorance of testing employees (E11) because it could be caused
of the ignorance of tester (E13).
Consequence of this approach is it can not guarantee 100% risk-free of the model,
differently with avoidance measure, because there is a chance that the treatment
is failled to mitigate the risk. The cost of prevention measure is certain whether
the risk occurs or not. Therefore, this type is not suited to mitigate the risk with
very low likelihood.
4.3 Alleviation
This measure intends to reduce the effect of risk to goal layer by employing effect
treatment in proper place (i.e., the impact relation between top event and goal).
Fig. 6. Alleviation Means
Model characteristic for this type is if the modeler can not find the way to avoid
or prevent the risk. For instance (in Fig. 6), oil price raise (E1) can be caused
by oil stock manipulation (E2) or gulf war (E3). The vehicle company does
not have capability to reduce the likelihood of both events therefore the only
possible thing to do is to mitigate s.t. the impact of E1 is less harm to the
goal layer. Besides that, this type is suited for the circumstance which there are
so many leaf-events need to be mitigated in order to prevent a top event s.t.
the total cost of mitigation action of the risk is not economic as we mention in
prevention measure.
Consequence of having un-mitigated risk will follow the success rate of treat-
ment in alleviating. Therefore, this measure is recommended to be applied if the
modeler is really sure it can reduce the impact of the risk otherwise the organi-
zation will suffer an un-mitigate risk. The probability of spending budget to do
this action will follow the likelihood of top event/risk and the likelihood of top
event is always less or equal than all its sub-events. Thus, it is very suitable for
the unlikely risks.
4.4 Detection
A treatment mitigates a intermediate event in event tree s.t. it reduces the risk.
In this circumstance, actually the failure has occurred within the organization
but the impacts of risk have not delivered yet to the goal layer.
Model characteristic for this type is once the modeler can not find mitigation
action with previous types. Moreover, this type will reduce the cost of treatment
if several events/risks share their sub-tree, because the treatment can mitigate
the overlapped sub-tree and it will reduce all the risks at the end. Typically, it is
done using evidence treatment. For example (in Fig. 7, re-schedule and maintain
test environment (T7) will reduce the likelihood of overload test environment
usage (E8), and consequently reduces the possibility of stress condition (E19)
for employees which can obstruct the achievement of the goal to improve work
environment condition (G12) and it also reduces the chance of having broken
test environment (E9) that could lead us to the denial of goal to do test vehicle
(G6) properly.
Consequence of this types will be catastrophic if the measure fails to reduce
the intermediate event, because it could cause more than one top-event/risk.
Therefore, the modeler should be aware of the final consequences if the coun-
termeasure fails and how much is the success rate of the countermeasure before
choosing this type. The probability of cost of the detection measures follows the
likelihood of its intermediate event (i.e., equal or higher than likelihood of top
events).
4.5 Retention
It is the last alternative for an organization to deal with its risk, once we can not
find any treatments from the previous types. This type of treatment is usually
Fig. 7. Detection Means
employed when the organization do not have capability to mitigate the risk (e.g.,
war, inflation, new competitor, natural disaster). For instance (in Fig. 8), the
risk of having new competitor (E7) is beyond the company capabilities and it
could obstruct the goal of having high specialized labor (G15) because they can
give better offer to the specialize labor. The only thing that company can do is
trying to give incentive for specialized labor (T5) s.t. the achievement of G15 is
maintained. Transfer the risk to an insurance company, restore the obstructed
goals, and design fault tolerance system can be categorized in this type. Because
they do not reduce the likelihood nor the effects of risks, they just try to make
the consequence of the risk is less catastrophic.
Consequence of applying this type is there is a certain period that the goal might
be un-satisfied before it is restored. Besides that, this measure can be seen as a
mean to fulfill the goal besides only as a treatment for the risk.
5 Experimental Result
In this section, we briefly present some experimental results of a case study
Vehicle Manufacture (in Fig. 9) obtained with the new algorithm and the help
Fig. 8. Retention Means
of an extension tool of the Goal Reasoning Tool1 (GR-Tool) developed within
the Tropos project.
For their implementation we started from the GR-Tool reasoning mechanisms
and we have re-implemented them introducing the necessary modifications as
described in Section 3. For more details about the GR-Tool and its extension we
suggest to visit the Tropos web page.
Suppose we want to obtain a fully satisfaction of all top goals i.e., reducing
cost (G1), increasing quality of vehicles (G2), and increasing Return of Invest-
ment(ROI) (G17) with avoid any risks on them. So we have as input { Sat(G1)
=F, Sat(G2) =F, Sat(G17) =F}. Executing Backward Reasoning we find a set
of possible solutions.For the case study, we have 14 alternative solutions (i.e.,
minimum assignment of input goals s.t. they achieve top goals) as seen in Ta-
ble. 1 (we eliminate the input goals that are taken by all alternative). In next
passage, we concentrate in analyzing the S1 which are the second cheapest al-
ternative. This choice is taken because S13 and S14 are using G14 to fulfill
top goals, i.e., G1 and G17 . This manner is too risky because once G14 fail
then there are more than one top goal will follow. Of course, other criteria can
be adopted for the selection of the alternative solution to be analyzed.
Table 2 summarizes the label values during the reasoning on S1. Forward
reasoning is applied then to calculate the effects of the selected solution to the
other goals of the model (column “Goal-Out” Table 2). Now, let suppose we have
evidence about the occurrence of some of the events and want to see the impact
of them on the goal layer. For example, considering the event assignment reported
in column “Event-In” (i.e., Sat(E7, E16, E17) =F and Sat(E2, E6, E12, E13, E14, E18)
=P), we obtain that (“Event-Out”) top goals G1 , G2 , G17 are partially
denied. In order to re-obtain the desiderata values for top goals we need to find
necessary treatments able to mitigate the risks. There are four possible counter-
measure sets that could be taken to mitigate the risks (see Table 5) and the total
1 http://sesa.dit.unitn.it/goaleditor/
Fig. 9. Goal Model for the Vehicle Manufacture
cost of countermeasures can be calculated summing up the single cost of input
treatments. In this experiment, we adopt C1 based on their costs and their side
effects. Even C1 is not the cheapest, it is worth because by choosing T4 instead
T3 , T4 gives positive effects to the achievement of G7 (i.e., even it is not one
of the input goals). Finally, the tool generates the final configuration with input
S1 and C1 (in column ”Treatment-Out”) where our desired values for top goals
are again obtained except G17 (i.e., Den(G17) =P). In this combination (i.e.,
S1 and C1), the effect of E1
−−S7−→ G9 is nullified by applying T4 s.t. E1 ∅7−→
G9 , and it also the case for E7
−S7−→ G15 and E14 −S7−→ E9.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a framework to model and reason about risk
within the requirements engineering process. We have adopt and extended the
Tropos goal modeling framework and proposed qualitative reasoning algorithms
to analyse risk during the process of evaluation and selection of alternatives.
Input Goal Cost S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14
G07: Use Raw Materials Efficiently 4 X X X X
G09: Reduce Energy Costs 5 X X X X
G13: Reduce Man-Power by Machine 9 X X X X
G14: Reduce Salaries 8 X X
G15: High Specialized Labour 7 X X X X X X X
G16: Supervise Labours Tightly 7 X X X X X X X
G23: Reduce Expenses 5 X X X X X X
G24: Reduce Tax Payment 5 X X X X X X
Total Cost 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 21 21 21 21 15 15
Table 1. Cost of Alternative Solutions
Cost C1 C2 C3 C4
T02: Create Labour Association 6 X X X X
T03: Have Partnership with Oil Company 6 X X
T04: Have Supply Chain Mgmt Sys 8 X X
T05: Give Incentive for Specialized Labour 7 X X X X
T06: Build Backup Test Env. 8 X X
T07: Re-Schedule-Maintain Test Env. 6 X X X X
T08: Re-assess Testing Method with Ext. Consultant 5 X X X X
T09: Training and Assessment for Test Designer 5 X X X X
T10: Have Long Contract for Specialized Labour 6 X X X X
Total Cost 43 51 41 49
However, this work has overcame one limitation of previous work which ,now,
it supports relationships between nodes (goals, events, tasks) and can model
situations where a treatment mitigates the risk reducing its impact on the goal
layer. by introducing the possibility to establish relations also between nodes
and arcs.
Besides that, this paper explains several type of measures that typically is
used to deal with the existence of risks in the organization. They are categories as:
avoidance, prevention, detection, alleviation, and retention. The modeler should
understand the model characteristics before choosing them, especially: preven-
tion, detection, alleviation, and be aware of their consequences. Because avoid-
ance is usually chosen if the condition allows, and retention is the last option if
there is no other type of measures that suits with the model. Thus, we would
emphasize in two consideration points in placing the measures:
– Possibility of spending budget mitigating the risk
Poss(Cost Prevention)À Poss(Cost Detection)À Poss(Cost Alleviation)
For prevention measure, it is certain that the organization will spend the bud-
get for this measures, and detection measure is less than prevention measure
but is still greater than the possibility of spending of alleviation measure.
– Success rate that is demanded for each type:
Pr(Success Prevention)¿ Pr(Success Alleviation)¿ Pr(Success Detection)
Goal Event Treat.
In Out In Out Out
S S D S S D S D
E01: Oil Price Raise - - - - P - P -
E02: Oil Stock Manipulation - - - P P - P -
E03: Gulf War - - - - - - - -
E04: Increase Minimum Salary Policy - - - - - - - -
E05: Strike - - - - P - - -
E06: Increase Unemployment Rate - - - P P - P -
E07: New Competitor - - - F F - F -
E08: Overload Test Env. Usage - - - - F - - -
E09: Broken Test Env. - - - - P - - -
E10: Inadequate Test Method - - - - P - - -
E11: Ignorance of Testing Employees - - - - P - P -
E12: Ignorance of Test Designer - - - P P - - P
E13: Ignorance of Tester - - - P P - P -
E14: Improper Test Design - - - P P - P -
E15: Bad Test Scheduling - - - - P - P -
E16: Heavy-Weight Test Design - - - F F - F -
E17: Tight Testing Schedule - - - F F - F -
E18: Run out resources - - - P P - P -
E19: Stress Situation - - - - P - - -
G01: Reduce Costs - F - - F P F -
G02: Increase Quality of Vehicles - F - - F P F -
G03: Reduce Resources Costs - F - - F P F -
G04: Have Efficient Production System F F - F F - F -
G05: Improve Production Chain - F - - F P F -
G06: Test Vehicles F F - F F P F -
G07: Use Raw Materials Efficiently - - - - - - P -
G08: Reduce Labour Costs - - - - P P P -
G09: Reduce Energy Costs F F - F F P F -
G10: Use Monitoring Mechanism F F - F F - F -
G11: Improve Labour Efficiency - F - - F - F -
G12: Improve Work Environments F F - F F P F -
G13: Reduce Man-Power by Machine - - - - - - - -
G14: Reduce Salaries - - P - P P P P
G15: High Specialized Labour F F - F F P F -
G16: Supervise Labours Tightly - P - - P - P -
G17: Increase ROI - F - - F P F P
G18: Reduce Investment Rate - F - - F - F -
G19: Decrease Cost - F - - F - F P
G20: Increase Revenue F F - F F P F P
G21: Prevent New Sys. Investment F F - F F - F -
G22: Selective Investment F F - F F - F -
G23: Reduce Expenses F F - F F - F P
G24: Reduce Tax Payment - - - - - - - -
T01: Manage Oil Supply - - - - - - F -
T02: Create Labour Association - - - - - - P -
T03: Have Partnership with Oil Company - - - - - - - -
T04: Have Supply Chain Mgmt Sys - - - - - - F -
T05: Give Incentive for Specialized Labour - - - - - - F -
T06: Build Backup Test Env. - - - - - P - P
T07: Re-Schedule-Maintain Test Env. - - - - - - F -
T08: Re-assess Testing Method with Ext. Consultant - - - - - - F -
T09: Training and Assessment for Test Designer - - - - - - F -
T10: Have Long Contract for Specialized Labour - - - - - - P -
Table 2. SAT-DEN values in Risk Analysis of S1
Before applying the measure in the model, the modeler should ensure the
success rate of the measure in mitigating the risk deploy it in the model.
The detection measure is demanded the highest success rate because it will
mitigate more than one top-risk, so its failure can cause several obstructions
in goal layer. The alleviation measure needs less than detection one but is
higher than prevention measure. Because the prevention measure usually
works with several others, its effect of failure can be reduced by the others,
and it is not the case for the alleviation because one it fails the impact of
the risk will deliver to goal layer as it is (i.e., typically, it obstructs only one
goal).
Finally, as done for goal models we want to propose also quantitative reason-
ing mechanisms where evidence is expressed in term of probability model.
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